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Back to the Future of Originalism
Josh Blackman*
INTRODUCTION
In the blink of the jurisprudential eye, the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) went to the brink of unconstitutionality and back. Along that
rapid journey, lawyers and scholars from across the philosophical spectrum
who were focused on developing, refining, and advancing constitutional
arguments at breakneck speeds, were often unable to pause and appreciate
the monumental importance of what was happening. This essay, as part of a
symposium issue for the Chapman Law Review, takes a step back, and
reflects on the legal challenge’s impact on originalism and constitutional
law.1
In NFIB v. Sebelius,2 originalists, who for decades have sought to
restore the original meaning of the Constitution, shied away from that task,
and advanced a strategy that would excise the individual mandate alone
without disturbing any New Deal-era precedents. Rather than asserting an
originalist challenge, the challengers turned to appeals to popular
constitutionalism and led a concerted effort to create, and then draw
attention to, the law’s unpopularity and unconstitutionality. This was a
concerted effort to move the argument from “off-the-wall” to “on-thewall.” These two moves—the decision not to assert the originalist case for
the unconstitutionality of the individual mandate and to appeal to popular
constitutionalism—have gone largely unrecognized and unappreciated.
Both of these choices speak to the potential limitations of originalism in a
world bound by entrenched precedents and the potential strength of
fostering social movements intent on restoring the “lost Constitution.”
* Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law. I would like to thank David Bernstein, Jack
Balkin, Randy Barnett, Andy Koppelman, Mike Ramsey, John McGinnis, Mike Rappaport, Tim
Sandefur, Ilya Shapiro, Lawrence Solum, Ilya Somin, Lee Strang, and Rebecca Zietlow for their
insights into this case, the litigation strategy, and what lessons we should draw. Further, I would like to
thank participants at the Georgetown University Law Center Advanced Constitutional Law Colloquium,
South Texas College of Law Faculty Lecture Series, the Western Michigan University Medical
Humanities Conference, the Mid-Atlantic Law & Society Association Conference, the Federalist
Society Faculty Conference, and the Loyola Law School Constitutional Law Colloquium for their
helpful feedback during presentations of this paper. I also benefited greatly from interviews with many
of the attorneys, think-tankers, government officials, and pundits who guided this case from the
beginning until the end.
1 See also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
OBAMACARE (forthcoming 2013) (discussing NFIB v. Sebelius).
2
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Through such social movements, advanced by groups like the Tea
Party, society witnessed a rededication, however convenient, to the
Constitution. Although the Affordable Care Act was ultimately upheld, one
of the greatest takeaways from the case was its contribution towards our
collective constitutional culture. This challenge has contributed to the
growing sentiment that the powers of the federal government are in fact
constrained, and that the New Deal cases may not have definitively
resolved the scope of federal power. Larry Solum has referred to this shift
in thinking as our now-unsettled “constitutional gestalt.”3
What does this unsettled gestalt portend for originalism? In NFIB, the
challengers made a conscious decision not to advance the originalist
argument. This choice may have costs. Namely, any immediate gains that
could have been obtained by striking down the mandate may in the long
run undermine originalist jurisprudence. This decision may risk harming
originalism, and open up originalist scholars to criticisms of being “fainthearted.” Perhaps NFIB represents a short-term victory for the ends, but a
long-term loss for the means.4
Yet, the litigation strategy in NFIB has shown that it is possible to
advance originalism without using originalism. Even when originalism is
not at the forefront, this jurisprudence exudes a gravitational pull that tugs
at the Constitution, and prevents it from drifting too far away its original
meaning. It is this pull that brought the Rehnquist Court’s “New
Federalism” back into the orbit of the original understanding, even if cases
such as Lopez,5 Morrison,6 and Printz7 were not by themselves originalist
challenges.
The challenge to the ACA was successful in unsettling our
constitutional gestalt because it seamlessly blended a theory of
constitutional law and the social movements that backed the theories. Both
of these avenues gravitated around the original understanding of the
Constitution. First, the theories were grounded in the Constitution’s
structural protections of individual liberty, and second, the movements
sought to restore what they viewed as the original Constitution. This
strategy provides a how-to manual for constitutional litigation. Learning
how to replicate this dual-focused phenomenon of popular originalism may
be the most enduring lesson for future constitutional challenges.
3 Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and The Constitutional Gestalt,
passim (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-152, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152653.
4 Such a calculus may have also influenced Chief Justice Roberts’ decision-making process,
though, he likely feared a short-term gain for federalism, paired with a long-term loss for the Court’s
institutional credibility. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law,
CBSNEWS.COM (July 1, 2012 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/robertsswitched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/.
5 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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I. THE ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTION
This Part explores how the originalist constitution evolved in the
challenge to the Affordable Care Act. First, I consider the significance of
the non-originalist challenge to the ACA. Second, I look at how originalists
were instrumental from moving the challenge to the ACA from “off-thewall” to “on-the-wall.” Third, I query what this challenge means for the
originalist goal of restoring the lost Constitution.8
A.

The Non-Originalist Challenge to the Affordable Care Act

1. Originally Originalist
Unlike earlier conservative or libertarian constitutional arguments, the
challenge to the ACA did not mobilize around the text and the history of
the Constitution. While the two-decades-long path to District of Columbia
v. Heller9 was paved with deep probing into the original understanding of
the Second Amendment,10 the challenge to the ACA, blazed in record time,
was grounded purely in terms of whether the mandate could be squared
with existing precedents of the Court or whether it was unprecedented.11
Originalism and textualism served only as secondary, backup arguments;
however, Justices both in the majority and in the dissent made numerous
originalist arguments.12 The genius of the strategy was to conform the

8 In this section, I focus quite heavily on the views of Randy Barnett as representative of broader
originalist and libertarian sentiments. Barnett, whom the New York Times dubbed the “intellectual
godfather” of the legal challenge of the mandate, was the leading legal voice in this challenge from this
outset, was responsible for, and should receive credit for many of the key strategic and jurisprudential
decisions in this case. See Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal
Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html?_r=0
(dubbing Barnett the “intellectual godfather”). Barnett has written a number of noted works, including:
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004);
RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT (2008); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998).
9 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
10 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
924, 926 (2009) (discussing the Court’s focus on the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted
based on its “original meaning”); see also Josh Blackman, Originalism for Dummies, (Dec. 19, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318387.
11 See, e.g., Precedents cited in health care battle, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:12 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-03-20/
precedents-supreme-court/53674608/1 (listing the four cases most likely to be cited by both sides of the
debate); Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart & Todd F. Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy
Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/why-the-personal-mandate-to-buy-health-insuranceis-unprecedented-and-unconstitutional (arguing that the mandate is unprecedented); David Orentlicher,
Precedents for Upholding Health Care Law, CNN (March 27, 2012, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/03/27/opinion/orentlicher-health-care/index.html (arguing there is ample precedent to support the
mandate).
12 See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, Originalism in the Health Care Case: What is a Direct Tax?, THE
ORIGINALISM BLOG
(July 8,
2012, 7:00
AM),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/
the-originalism-blog/2012/07/originalism-in-the-health-care-case-what-is-a-direct-taxmichaelramsey.html (discussing direct taxes); Michael Ramsey, Originalism in the Health Care Decision: The
Federal Government’s “Problem-Solving Powers,” THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 6, 2012, 7:00 AM),

Do Not Delete

328

4/13/2013 11:18 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 16:2

argument within the Court’s existing precedents: to strike down the
mandate would not require overturning a single precedent. Indeed, five
Justices accepted this position, entirely consistent with the Court’s
jurisprudence from M’Culloch v. Maryland13 to Wickard v. Filburn14 to
Gonzales v. Raich.15 However, the originalist dog that did not bark speaks
volumes about the potency of originalism in significant constitutional
challenges such as this.
In late 2009, even before the enactment of the ACA, most prominent
constitutional theorists who focused on originalist scholarship readily
conceded that the individual mandate was not consistent with the original
understanding of the Constitution—namely the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.16 On September 18, 2009, six months before
the law’s enactment, Randy Barnett, in noting that “the Supreme Court has
certainly not limited either the enumerated commerce power or the implied
spending power to the original meaning of the text,”17 wondered aloud
whether the Court could strike down Obamacare based on original
meaning: “[s]tranger things have happened. After all, without any
precedent standing in their way, a majority of the Supreme Court decided
to follow the original meaning of the text of the Second Amendment in
District of Columbia v. Heller.”18
Barnett, along with Todd Gaziano and Nathaniel Stewart, authored a
seminal report for The Heritage Foundation laying out the case against the
mandate.19 In addition to developing the activity/inactivity distinction—an
argument entirely consistent with modern Supreme Court precedent—the
report also asserted that an originalist challenge to the law was a possible
route.
[T]he 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller shows that a majority of the
current Court takes the text and original public meaning of the Constitution quite

http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2012/07/originalism-in-the-health-caredecision-the-federal-governments-problem-solving-powersmichael-ramsey.html (highlighting exchange
between Justice Ginsburg and the joint dissent).
13 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 359–60 (1819) (holding Congress has the power to
incorporate a bank even when such is not a power enumerated within the Constitution).
14 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942) (holding that even a wheat farmer’s trivial
contribution to the market, when combined with the contributions of other similarly situated farmers,
was subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause because the commerce power “extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to
regulate interstate commerce” (citation omitted)).
15 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005) (holding Congress “had a rational basis for believing
that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping
hole in [Congress’s Application of Controlled Substance Act (CSA)].”).
16 Barnett et al., supra note 11.
17 Randy Barnett, Healthcare: Is “mandatory insurance” unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18,
2009),
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Randy_Barnett_8256A4EF-01E6-4207-B4E8C761F2FDB5BF.html.
18 Id. (italics added).
19 Barnett et al., supra note 11.
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seriously, especially when considering issues not controlled by existing
precedent. A constitutional challenge to an individual health care mandate would
be considered an opportunity by the Justices who made up the Heller majority to
further vindicate their commitment to text and history in evaluating claims of
federal power.20

2. The Move Away from Originalism
Ultimately the challengers to the Affordable Care Act decided not to
ground their arguments in originalism, and did not seek the reversal of
precedents concerning the scope of federal power stretching from Wickard
v. Filburn21 to Gonzales v. Raich.22 Randy Barnett explained this decision
in some detail. First, Barnett acknowledged that, based on his
understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution, the individual
mandate is clearly unconstitutional.23 In his 2010 article, Commandeering
the People, Barnett wrote, “[U]nder the original meaning of the Commerce
Clause, as affirmed by the Court, Congress lacks any power over the health
insurance business. The insurance business, like the businesses of
manufacturing or agriculture, is to be regulated exclusively by the states.”24
Or, more clearly stated in a footnote, “As suggested in Part I, both the
regulations imposed on insurance companies, and the insurance mandate
imposed on individuals, most likely exceed the original scope of the
enumerated powers of Congress.”25
Second, Barnett concedes that a key non-originalist precedent stands
in the way of restoring the original understanding of commerce with
respect to insurance contracts—a matter that should be left for the states. In
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association26—a decidedly
unoriginalist opinion—Justice Black reversed Paul v. Virginia,27 which had
held that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce.”28 In September of 2012—three months after NFIB v.
Sebelius—Barnett made similar points during his address at the Cato
Institute’s Constitution Day Symposium: “Doctrines certainly constrained
us in our challenges to the Affordable Care Act. We might like to have
contested the insurance company regulations as outside the bounds of the
original meaning of the Commerce Clause but we were definitively
foreclosed by such an argument by the 1944 case of U.S. v. South-Eastern

Id.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate
is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 586–87 (2010).
24 Id. at 585.
25 Id. at 624 n.154.
26 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
27 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869), overruled by United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543–50 (1944).
28 Id. at 183.
20
21
22
23
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Underwriters.”29 Or, stated more precisely, “Under the original meaning of
the Constitution, for example, Congress would have no power to regulate
the health insurance business since insurance contracts—like the practice of
medicine—are not ‘commerce,’ which is why both activities have
traditionally been regulated by the states.”30
Third, without acknowledging that these non-originalist precedents are
correct, Barnett still contends that under current Supreme Court law, the
individual mandate is unconstitutional.31 “Existing doctrine reveals the
individual mandate is unconstitutional even if we assume that Congress has
the power to regulate the insurance business that the New Deal Supreme
Court gave it in South-Eastern Underwriters.”32 Rather, solely for the
purposes of this case, the challengers were willing to forego this originalist
argument and focus on how the Supreme Court—for better, but mostly for
worse—has developed the doctrine.33 Barnett wrote quite clearly that he
has not “rested [his] claim that the individual insurance mandate was
unconstitutional on the original meaning of the Constitution, and neither
did the parties to the lawsuit.”34
“This entire case was pursued under existing post-New Deal
Commerce Clause and Necessary & Proper Clause doctrine.”35 “[M]y
claim is that the mandate is unconstitutional in the second sense: based on
what the Supreme Court has said in its Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clause decisions . . . and also in its tax power decisions . . . .”36
Because the mandate was unprecedented, in that it went beyond anything
Congress had attempted before or anything the Supreme Court had
considered, its constitutionality was not settled.
Importantly, this “second” sense must be distinguished from what
Barnett has described as the first and third senses of constitutionality. The
first sense focuses on “what the Constitution says and means,” while the
third sense asks “whether there are five votes on the Supreme Court to
uphold or invalidate the action.”37
29 Randy Barnett, Address at the Cato Institute’s Constitution Day Symposium: The Supreme
Court: Past and Prologue: A Look at the October 2011 and 2012 Terms, Panel I: Obamacare and
Enumerated
Powers
(Sept.
18,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cato.org/
events/ccs2012/index.html.
30 Id.; see also Josh Blackman, Originalism and Obamacare, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Oct. 11,
2012),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/10/11/originalism-and-obamacare/
(quoting
Randy Barnett on his opposition to the Affordable Care Act) (transcribing the quoted
text).
31 Barnett, supra note 23.
32 Id. at 587.
33 Id. at 586.
34 Randy Barnett, Elhauge Replies to Hamburger, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 22, 2012, 11:52
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/22/elhauge-replies-to-hamburger/.
35
36
37

Id.

Barnett, supra note 23, at 586.
Randy Barnett, In What Sense is the Personal Health Insurance Mandate “Unconstitutional”?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 16, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/16/in-what-senseis-the-personal-health-insurance-mandate-unconstitutional/.
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To argue that the Court should roll back unoriginalist precedents
would be a nonstarter. As Larry Solum put it, “[y]ou cannot argue to a
District Court that it should overrule a recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court—the move is ‘off the wall,’ ‘out of bounds,’ and ‘beyond
the pale [sic].’”38 There were not enough votes to accomplish this
position—this is the “third” sense of Barnett’s understanding of
constitutionality.39 As Justice Brennan was fond of saying, “Five votes can
do anything around here.”40 In order to advance this argument, the
challengers had to move the argument from off-the-wall to on-the-wall.
B.

Moving the Argument from Off-The-Wall to On-The-Wall
How the arguments went from being taken seriously by a small cadre
of libertarian scholars to garnering five votes on the Supreme Court is a
fascinating story of constitutional persuasion on related fronts: legal and
populist. This narrative is well encapsulated in a series of back-and-forths
between Barnett and Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin (who are in fact
excellent friends).
1. Of Theories and Movements
To Balkin, Barnett’s strategy was two-fold: on the one hand, Barnett
was advancing a theory about constitutional law that was largely deemed
frivolous; yet, at the same time, Barnett was also trying, through his own
gravitas as a noted constitutional scholar, to convince people that his
argument is not frivolous.
Randy Barnett wants you to know that his argument was not frivolous. But he is
not simply reporting a fact about the world. He is engaged in a performative
utterance. He is trying to make this statement true by the fact that he, a prominent
constitutional theorist and litigator, is saying it. And he is trying to get enough
people to agree with him so that what he says is true will actually become true.41

There is something of a chicken-and-the-egg dynamic at play in
Balkin’s view. A constitutional theory only becomes non-frivolous when
people accept it. But, before people accept a constitutional theory, it must
be non-frivolous. “If Randy and his allies are successful in changing public
and professional opinion, then they will move these ideas from off the wall
to on the wall. They will make arguments that were once considered
frivolous serious arguments, and possibly even winning arguments.”42
Barnett was indeed successful about moving the idea from off-the-wall to
on-the-wall. Although Barnett was not successful in winning the ultimate
Solum, supra note 3, at 16.
See Barnett, supra note 37.
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL
DECISION 16 (2008). See generally Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).
41 Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett Wants Us to Know that His Commerce Clause Argument is not
Frivolous, BALKINIZATION (July 19, 2010, 1:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/randybarnett-wants-us-to-know-that-his.html.
42 Id.
38
39
40
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case, his success in moving the argument onto the wall “would work a
significant change in existing law”: to Balkin he “changed the practical
meaning of the Constitution, and changed it a great deal.”43 This change, in
effect, is the change that Larry Solum has referred to as the “constitutional
gestalt.”44
According to Barnett, when Balkin calls his constitutional arguments
“off-the-wall” and associates them with libertarian attempts to restore an
originalist vision of constitutional law, Balkin “is trying to marginalize the
challenge to the individual mandate by connecting the argument about its
constitutionality to [Barnett’s] and others [sic] ‘off-the-wall’ departures
from conventional constitutional argument.”45 Implicitly, Barnett concedes
that popular libertarian constitutional goals are still “off-the-wall,” and are
not ready to be accepted.
I can tell you what an ‘off-the-wall’—but in my view constitutionally sound—
challenge to ObamaCare would look like: it would contest whether Congress has
the power to regulate insurance companies under the Commerce Clause, given
that the original meaning of ‘commerce’ did not extend to insurance contracts,
which is why for 100 years the insurance business was regulated state by state. 46

The notion of “off-the-wall” is descriptive of the current acceptance of
an argument by the Supreme Court, not its soundness or its normative
appeal. Barnett would maintain that this originalist challenge is accurate,
but not the argument to make. “Contending that the Court enforce the
original meaning of the Commerce Clause and refuse Congress the power
to regulate health insurance would be an accurate reading of the
Constitution in my view, but it would also be ‘off-the-wall’ at this point.”47
Thus, while maintaining that “off-the-wall” notions of originalism are still
sound and normatively appealing, libertarians can still advance a nonoriginalist argument that has the potential of moving to on-the-wall.
Barnett and other libertarians did not make the “off-the-wall”
originalist argument. “But here is the thing. No one is making this
argument. Not me, not ‘the large group of conservative and libertarian
lawyers, politicians, and activists who want [sic] to change the public’s
mind about the powers of the federal government,’ and certainly not the
Attorneys General of 21 states.”48 Rather, they look solely “at the law as it
currently exists and [observe] that the Supreme Court has never upheld the
use of the commerce power to mandate that everyone engage in economic
activity.”49 Because all that the Court “has ever done is [to] regulate or

Id.
Solum, supra note 3, at 3.
Randy Barnett, Balkin “Flips,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 20, 2010, 5:07 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2010/07/20/balkin-flips/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
43
44
45

48
49

Id.

Id.
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prohibit those who choose to engage in economic activity. . . . [T]here is no
existing authority for extending the Commerce Clause this far.”50
2. Popular Constitutionalism
To move this argument “onto the wall,” and to change the
constitutional gestalt, the challengers employed tools of popular
constitutionalism. The legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act, although
short of total success, represents an unexpectedly effective social
movement. Through a series of influential Op-Eds, speeches, and blog
posts, conservative and libertarian lawyers and professors advanced a
simple reason why the ACA is unconstitutional—namely, it is
unprecedented for Congress to force a person to engage in commerce.51
Epitomized by the now-infamous image of broccoli, the challengers asked
whether Congress could compel people to buy that flowery green.52
The challengers advanced a very simple constitutional idea: a mandate
forcing people to engage in commerce is unprecedented.53 In a very short
time, a movement mobilized around this new way of looking at the
Constitution; from the halls of the Ivory Tower, to the halls of Congress,
and, ultimately, to the halls of the federal courts—taking this idea from
“off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall.”54 Almost lost amidst the Court’s opinion in
NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the Affordable Care Act under Congress’s
taxing power, was the fact that a majority of the Court unexpectedly
accepted the challenger’s primary argument.55 This way, paved by decades
of conservative and libertarian scholarship,56 fortified by the New
Federalism precedents of the Rehnquist Court,57 and advanced by the thenburgeoning Tea Party, “[a] constitutional gestalt shift [snuck] up on the
community of constitutional actors.”58
At first, most constitutional scholars ridiculed the challenge to the
ACA.59 Balkin and a select few others took it more seriously, very much
Id.
Blackman, supra note 1.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.; see generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17–18 (2011) (defining “off-thewall”). For my review of Balkin’s book, see Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 269 (2012).
55 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012); see also id. at 2649–50
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). Arguably, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito did not join Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but Roberts did by reference agree with the four
joint-dissenters. Thus, broadly stated, there were five votes for this position.
56 Solum, supra note 3, at 22 (“The constitutional challenge to Sebelius began its journey to the
Supreme Court in an intellectual environment shaped by a constitutional gestalt that structured the field
of constitutional argument.”).
57 Id. at 23 (“The New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court posed a challenge to the
constitutional gestalt that read the New Deal Settlement as creating plenary and unlimited national
legislative power.”).
58 Id. at 19.
59 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
50
51
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cognizant of how a social movement could advance after it got “onto the
wall.” Balkin was uniquely positioned to augur the potential outcome of
this case, for he “observed . . . that politics and political parties played an
important role, perhaps the crucial role, in combination with intellectuals
and social movements.”60 Balkin asserted, “Randy and his allies are trying
to change people’s minds through op-eds, speeches, protests, and litigation.
They are trying to move things from ‘off the wall’ to ‘on the wall.’ And
this is not the first time people have tried to do this.”61 This process of
constitutional contestation had the effect of causing “a constitutional gestalt
shift . . . . Arguments may occur in the public sphere, in the legal academy,
in legislative and executive forums within both state and national political
institutions—and in the courts of law.”62
Barnett reflected on the social movement that enabled the challenge to
NFIB v. Sebelius, noting that “[t]here is for the first time a popular political
movement on behalf of the written Constitution, especially its powerconstraining clauses. This ‘constitutional conservative’ movement is
famously associated with the Tea Party, but extends well beyond.”63 If the
same legal argument had been presented without the groundswell of
support, it would not have made it before. Rather, this popular
constitutional support nearly pushed the argument over the broccoli finish
line.
Randy Barnett further commented on the nature of the political
movements behind the challenge, when he addressed the American
Constitution Society’s 2011 National Convention:
[I] do want to get back to . . . the politics of [the Affordable Care Act] for a
minute because I understand you had a very lively panel yesterday on original
meaning . . . . But I take it that the valence in this room is kind of not all that
sympathetic with original meaning. Original meaning, as far as I understand it,
says the meaning of the Constitution must remain the same until it’s properly
changed . . . but the opposite of [originalism], or the different position of that, is
that the meaning of the Constitution evolves over time to respond to changing
conditions and also to respond to political initiatives, or what my friend Jack
Balkin calls social movements. That is what the alternative to original meaning
is, which is the evolution of constitutional meaning according to political

Mainstream,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-wentmainstream/258040/.
60 Solum, supra note 3, at 22; see also Balkin, supra note 59. For further discussion of
Balkin’s views on popular constitutionalism, see Josh Blackman, The Affordable Care Act and Popular
Constitutionalism, 26 Public Affairs Quarterly ___ (forthcoming 2013).
61 Balkin, supra note 41.
62 Solum, supra note 3, at 19.
63 Randy Barnett, The Mirage of Progressive Originalism: A New Legal Theory Attempts—and
fails—to Unite Leftist Politics with Constitutional Fidelity, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390444914904577619763983330558.html (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012)).
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movements. Well, look if you guys believe in that, then obviously you may be
looking at a political movement in the face.
Political movements sometimes will go in your direction, and political
movements will sometimes not go in your direction. If political movements don’t
go in your direction, it is difficult to rush in with that copy of the
Constitution . . . and say no, no, no, it’s the Constitution . . . that stops you guys
from doing it. Not if you at the same time think it’s political movements that
causes [sic] the meaning of the Constitution to change . . . through judicial
appointments . . . confirmed or not confirmed by a politically representative
Senate. That is just the way business is done.
Not only should you not be surprised. You should also not complain.
Except . . . if that day were ever to come . . . you are simply on the losing end of
a democratic process, and then we have judicial restraint to fall back on. You
guys have judicial restraint to fall back on in protecting the outcome of
this . . . political debate that you may have lost. I just want to suggest that maybe,
just maybe, the original Constitution might have something to offer you guys if
and when you are ever on the losing end of a political movement. 64

In other words, what’s good for the goose is now good for the gander.
This case turned the tables on much more than just our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. More recently, Randy Barnett has described the realist
nature of this reversal more bluntly:
We also have the realist fact that five Justices embraced the entirety of our
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause arguments. Critics like
Charles Fried can dismiss this as emanating from the leaderless Tea Party . . . but
it is now embraced by what is called the ‘Rule of Five.’ Even if the Tea Party
played a role, we have long been told that this is how the living Constitution—by
which is meant constitutional doctrine—evolves in response to social
movements. So unless it is a living constitutionalism for me, but not for thee, if
the outcome of this case was indeed impelled by popular constitutionalism, that
would make it more, not less legitimate on living constitutionalist grounds.65

Balkin was more cynical of the nature of this change.66
All social and political movements that seek to change the Constitution in
practice do something like this, although the exact strategies and methods may
differ. Attempting this is part of the process of constitutional change. It is an
aspect of living constitutionalism. (This is one of the greatest ironies of modern
conservative originalism—it is a perfect example of how living constitutionalism
actually works in practice).67

64 See National Power to Address the Nation’s Problems: The Constitutionality of the Affordable
Care
Act,
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY
(June
18,
2011),
http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/national-power-to-address-the-nations-problems-theconstitutionality-of-the-affordable-ca (beginning at 1:31:30). Please note, the above is the author’s
rough translation and emphasis has been added.
65 Cato Institute Reviews Supreme Court’s Recent Term, C-SPAN (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.cspan.org/Events/Cato-Institute-Reviews-Supreme-Courts-Recent-Term/10737434182/ (beginning at
18:50) (emphasis added).
66 Balkin, supra note 41.
67 Id.
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This sentiment is indeed quite ironic, especially in light of how critical
conservatives have been for decades about the Justices reacting to political
and social movements instead of focusing solely on the Constitution.
A. Restoring the Lost Constitution?
Although Barnett publicly distanced himself from bringing an
originalist challenge to the Affordable Care Act, detractors and critics—
buoyed by Barnett’s decade-long originalist scholarship trail—assailed
Barnett, claiming that NFIB was in fact an attempt to restore the Lost
Constitution, or more pejoratively, to bring back the Constitution in Exile.68
Professor Jeffrey Rosen, far more cynical of Barnett’s motives than Balkin,
said, “[l]et’s not pretend that this is just a modest case of applying existing
precedents,” and asked, largely rhetorically, “[t]he question is: [a]re you
going to reverse decades of judicial deference in economic matters?”69 In
response, Barnett insists “[n]othing about existing Supreme Court doctrine
needs to change for us to prevail in this case.”70 In fact, Barnett argues that
he and the plaintiffs in Gonzales v. Raich71 did not seek to overturn
Wickard v. Filburn72 outright, but instead sought to distinguish that
“wheaty” case.73 “While devoting pages to this argument,” Barnett recalled,
“in a single sentence we did ask that Wickard be reconsidered ‘if the Court
were to conclude that Wickard is controlling’ (i.e. if it rejected our
distinctions), but this is an obligatory request never mentioned in oral
argument.”74
In a response to a similar point made by Ian Millhiser at
ThinkProgress,75 Barnett commented, “[A] decision to invalidate the
individual insurance mandate would not require the Supreme Court to
overturn ANY of these precedents you like. If it did, we would not have so
good a chance to prevail as we do.”76 Barnett asserted that the fact that
68 Randy Barnett, Academic Reaction to Oral Argument on the ACA Challenge, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(April
30,
2012,
10:55
AM)
http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/30/
academic-reaction-to-oral-argument-on-the-aca-challenge/.
69 Nina Totenberg, Health Care Decision Hinges On A Crucial Clause, NPR (June 11, 2012, 4:34
AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/11/154583824/health-care-decision-hinges-on-a-crucial-clause
(internal quotation marks omitted).
70 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
72 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
73 Randy Barnett, Jeff Rosen Responds to Critics, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 29, 2012, 12:01
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/29/jeff-rosen-responds-to-critics/.
74 Id.
75 See Ian Millhiser, Architect of Anti-Health Care Lawsuit Admits To His Broader Agenda — No
National Child Labor Laws, No Minimum Wage, THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2012, 5:00 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/12/498288/randys-fakeconstitution/?fb_comment_id=fbc_10150862594781078_22609833_10150864646626078#f3b8e0dd74
(discussing Barnett’s alleged views).
76 Randy Barnett, Comment to Architect of Anti-Health Care Lawsuit Admits To His Broader
Agenda—No National Child Labor Laws, No Minimum Wage, THINKPROGRESS (June 13, 2012, 3:08
PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/12/498288/randys-fake-constitution/
?fb_comment_id=fbc_10150862594781078_22609833_10150864646626078#f3b8e0dd74.
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originalists are not making originalist arguments is not important: “That I
hold other views, such as a commitment to originalism, that [sic] are not
being put forward in this challenge is irrelevant to the merits of the
arguments we are making in court (as they were in Raich).”77
However, Rosen may be somewhat correct, albeit indirectly. The aim
of the strategy was not to reverse decades of precedents, but rather to jolt a
rethinking of those precedents going forward. It is not necessary to
overturn precedents in order to change the law. The underlying victory, I
think, is what Larry Solum has referred to as the “constitutional gestalt.”78
II. THE SHIFTED “CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT”
Though the Affordable Care Act survived, in the words of Justice
Ginsburg, “largely unscathed,”79 the impact of NFIB v. Sebelius extends far
beyond the constitutionality of the individual mandate. In a path-breaking
article about the state of constitutional law following NFIB, Professor Larry
Solum identifies a change in our constitutional landscape—what he calls
the constitutional gestalt.80 The social movement against the ACA had the
effect of unsettling many constitutional assumptions that have existed since
the New Deal, and it created grounds for contestations of the scope of
federal power.81 This—and not the Chief Justice’s curious vote—may be
the important contribution for the future of constitutional law and our
Constitution. Yet, this change in the gestalt, independent of originalism,
also speaks to the importance of originalism as a tool in these future
contests. I conclude by speculating about possible end games of libertarian
constitutional thought.
A. NFIB’s Unsettling of Our Constitutional Gestalt
The state of our constitutional law does not merely consist of rules and
precedents. Professor Larry Solum has written that “[at] the very highest
level of abstract, our constitutional theories and narratives reflect and
contain what might be called the constitutional gestalt—a holistic picture
that organizes the constitutional materials (the text, cases, and practices)
and the norms of constitutional argument.”82 As Solum observed, “In
NFIB, five Justices of the Supreme Court endorsed a view of the commerce
clause [sic] that is inconsistent with the constitutional gestalt associated
with the New Deal Settlement. A fissure has opened in constitutional
See Barnett, supra note 73 (emphasis added).
See infra Part V; see also Solum, supra note 3, at 2.
See Adam Liptak, Justices, By 5–4, Uphold Health Care Law; Roberts in Majority; Victory
For
Obama,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
29,
2012,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-law-largelystand.html?pagewanted=all.
80 Solum, supra note 3, at 26.
81 See id. at 2.
82 See id. at 16 (describing a constitutional gestalt as “an overall picture of the constitutional
landscape”) (quote from original article, on file with author).
77
78
79
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politics, creating space for an alternative constitutional gestalt.”83 Now,
what were once “[u]ndisputed norms” about the scope of federal power can
now be questioned, and arguments which “once were ‘off the wall’ are now
seen as ‘on the wall.’”84 The notion of the unsettled gestalt accurately
captures how our system of law changed after NFIB—even though the
ACA survived.
In a July 2010 blog post, two years before the Supreme Court’s
decision, Jack Balkin honed in on the challenger’s efforts to change our
constitutional landscape:
Randy is part of a large group of conservative and libertarian lawyers, politicians,
and activists who want to change the public’s mind about the powers of the
federal government. They want the public and the courts to rethink the
assumptions of the activist state that came with the New Deal. They want to
restrain the growth of the federal government and push it back, because they
believe that this is more faithful to the Constitution as they understand it. 85

Solum recognized that “[a] shift in the gestalt can only occur with
support developments in constitutional politics off and on the Court.”86
Barnett was correct in refuting Balkin’s claim that the challenge
directly sought to return to pre-New Deal era precedents. But Balkin’s
prescient claim was much broader. The challenge, whether successful or
unsuccessful in killing the ACA, had the much deeper objective of
affecting how people think about the Constitution, the federal government,
and individual liberty. Or, as Solum stated it, “[t]he most important indirect
effect of NFIB is that it enables constitutional contestation over the content
of the gestalt and the meaning of the New Deal Settlement.”87
After NFIB v. Sebelius, our society has gone through just such a
rethinking. Putting aside the issue of whether there was a five-vote block to
strike down the mandate as a violation of the Commerce Clause,88 or if the
Chief’s discussion of the Commerce Clause was holding or dictum,89 the
long-term victory of this case was changing how the Constitution is viewed
by the people—and this is likely what concerned Balkin far more than the

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 20.
Balkin, supra note 41.
Solum, supra note 3, at 27.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
See id. at 3 (“The technical analysis leads to the conclusion that on the Commerce-Clause
issues, NFIB is unlikely to produce stare decisis effects that are clear and uncontested—one way or the
other.”).
89 Ilya Somin, A Simple Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, V OLOKH C ONSPIRACY (July
2, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictummess/; see also Randy Barnett, Quin Hillyer: “John Roberts’ Travesty, Point by Point”, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/09/quin-hillyer-john-robertstravesty-point-by-point/; Randy Barnett, Quote of the Week, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 12:41
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/quote-of-the-week/.
83
84
85
86
87
88
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Affordable Care Act’s fate. And with this sea change of thought, a new tide
has arrived, drawn in by the currents of “constitutional contestation.”90
The long-term effects of NFIB are uncertain. However, we know that
“grounds of constitutional contestation will have been changed—the
dominant constitutional gestalt has become open to challenge through
formal legal argument in ordinary litigation.”91 Future challenges to the
scope of federal power will no longer be scoffed at as ridiculous—consider
the drastic change in reactions to the challenge in 2009 and 2012. Scholars
will be able to put forth ideas about laws that may be suspect after NFIB.92
Movements will continue to advance understandings of constitutional
norms consistent with a federal government of enumerated powers.
Politicians will incorporate constitutionalist ideals in legislative debates
over the scope of federal power. And, perhaps most importantly, judges at
all levels will now have a precedent upon which to act based on these
cases.
B.

NFIB’s Implications for Originalism
Barnett’s concession that an originalist challenge to the ACA would
be “off-the-wall”93 speaks volumes about the limits of originalism when
unmoored from a popular constitutional backing. When confronted with
perhaps the largest and most significant constitutional law challenge of a
generation, rather than advancing an “off-the-wall” argument that is
consistent with originalism—the predominant jurisprudence of modern-day
libertarians—the challengers turned to something else, and it was not just
an argument about the extent of the Court’s precedents. Rather, as Balkin
acknowledges, the challengers aimed to change public opinion, and bring
the unprecedented argument into the realm of plausibility.94 Once the
argument crossed that threshold, it was off to the races—and it only
partially crossed the finish line when Chief Justice Roberts seized defeat
from the jaws of victory.
1. The Means of Originalism and the Ends of Libertarianism
NFIB reveals that fidelity to originalism must take a back seat when
more lofty goals can be obtained—goals that are unobtainable through
See Solum, supra, note 3, at 3.
Id. at 26.
See id. at 27 (“NFIB has opened the space for constitutional contestation—and that space is
already being occupied, in the blogs, at academic conferences, in position papers, water cooler
discussions, email exchanges, briefs, and judicial opinions. Competing doctrinal arguments, theories,
and narratives are already in play.”).
93 See Barnett, supra note 45.
94 See Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Justice by the Numbers: When it Comes to Deciding
the Future of Obamacare, the Supreme Court Should Ignore Public Opinion, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2012,
2:56
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2012/04/the_supreme_court_and_obamacare_the_justices_should_be_careful_not_to_let
_public_opinion_guide_their_decisions_.single.html#pagebreak_anchor_2 (suggesting that the Court
should ignore public opinion).
90
91
92
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originalism. The decision to not advance the originalist argument was
grounded in the fact that the challengers wanted to win the case. As Solum
has observed, “[m]any originalists believe that the New Deal cases
expanded Congress’s Commerce Clause power beyond the limits of
original meaning . . . . [Although] as a practical matter, it would be
impracticable and costly to undo New Deal and Great Society or to amend
the Constitution to authorize these programs.”95
But, this strategic decision may have costs. The short-term gains for
freedom (striking down the mandate) may be in tension with undermining
constitutionalism (a jurisprudence supporting a libertarian Constitution).96
This constitutionalism is an important protection for freedom in the long
term. By not advancing these ideas when it counts the most, the
jurisprudence may be somewhat undermined. By refraining from advancing
originalist arguments in support of originalist ends, the methodology may
become divorced from, and in effect dilute the theory.
Perhaps NFIB represents a short-term victory for the ends, but a longterm loss for the means. Solum observes that this approach might “mitigate
the damage done to original meaning by precedent and practice.”97
However, if limited government can be achieved without primarily
pursuing originalism (such as the ACA case), a cynic could argue that
originalism is merely a front for what libertarians seek. In other words,
when libertarianism becomes unmoored from originalism, the objective
nature of the libertarian Constitution becomes weaker.98
By not advancing their signature methodology, libertarians risk
undermining, and perhaps sacrificing, the normative appeal of originalism
as an objective school of constitutional thought. Should libertarians simply
try to achieve the goals of a freer society and limited government without
concerns for how the arguments are made? Or should libertarians seek to
achieve limited government through originalism?
2. Faint-Hearted Originalism?
In an article criticizing Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” originalism,
Randy Barnett found objectionable Scalia’s “willing[ness] to avoid
objectionable outcomes that would result from originalism by invoking the
precedents established by the dead hand of nonoriginalist Justices.”99
However, Barnett rejected the premise that “if so lion-hearted a jurist as
[Scalia] shrinks in practice from the implications of a theory he so
Solum, supra note 3, at 25.
I credit Ilya Somin for this formulation. See generally Somin, supra note 89.
Solum, supra note 3, at 25.
See also Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 269, 282 (2012)
(“Such a theory unmoors originalism from things that are original by relying on occurrences that
postdate the enactment of the law.”).
99 Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 7, 13 (2006).
95
96
97
98
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vociferously defends . . . [then] originalism itself ought to be rejected as
unworkable and ultimately unwise,” in that “Justice Scalia is simply not an
originalist.”100
The challengers to the ACA were afflicted with a related strain of
faint-heartedness as advocates. Barnett concedes that “[c]onstitutional
conservatives don’t yearn for a bygone age of Supreme Court rulings.”101
In other words, they do not seek the wholesale repeal of six decades of
precedents. It may just be that the end goal of enforcing the entire
Constitution requires the concession—though not acquiescence—of a
number of nonoriginalist precedents. This sounds, however, somewhat
faint-hearted.
While professing a deeply-held belief in restoring the lost
Constitution, the challengers were willing to rely on—but not
acknowledge—nonoriginalist precedents, to achieve what is in effect an
originalist goal.102 By focusing on this one law, the challengers were able to
move the constitutional goalposts somewhat, to effect a change on the legal
landscape, without a wholesale reversal of many twentieth century
precedents.
Maybe we can call this approach “incremental originalism”—moving
the Constitution towards original meaning without even arguing that nonoriginalist precedents should be overturned. Solum refers to this concession
as “‘originalist second best’: given the practical impossibility of the firstbest originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the originalist might
argue for doctrines that limits departures from original meaning to those
required by practical necessity.”103 Incremental originalism may be a
pragmatic theory to reconcile constitutional originalism with faint-hearted
originalism.
3. Advancing Originalism without Originalism
Perhaps this utilitarian calculus may indeed indirectly benefit
originalism. By using non-originalist arguments to move the law toward
originalist ends, the challengers ultimately strengthened our fidelity to the
original meaning of the Constitution in a roundabout way. By garnering
five votes to cabin the power of Congress, originalists accomplished just
this task. In fact, the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, and those of the
joint dissenters, were replete with citations to founding-era sources, such as
the Federalist and the ratification debates—this demonstrates originalism’s
gravitational pull.104
Id.
Barnett, supra note 63.
See Solum, supra note 3.
Id. at 25.
I thank Randy Barnett for helping me develop this formulation. See
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/18/originalisms-gravitational-pull-towards-original-meaning/.
This topic will be discussed in Barnett’s Dunwody Lecture at the University of Florida in March 2013.
100
101
102
103
104
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III. ORIGINALISM’S GRAVITATIONAL PULL
A.

Three Views of Federalism
In order to understand how a non-originalist argument advances
originalism, we must first consider the nature of existing precedents. Randy
Barnett explained that there are three views of federalism (and, I would
add, relatedly, federalism’s structural protection of individual liberty).105
First, there is the pre-1937 view, where the Court, unbound by modern
precedents, can rule in accordance with the original public meaning of the
Constitution.106 Second, there is the New Deal-era view of federalism,
wherein Congress has a plenary police power to do whatever it deems
necessary, and any law that fits within the New Deal’s ambit will be
upheld.107 Third, there is the “New Federalism” of the Rehnquist and now
Roberts Court.108
This third strand can be best characterized as “this far, but no
farther.”109 In other words, the New Federalism did not repudiate the New
Deal view of federalism, nor did it effect a return to the pre-1937 view of
federalism. Rather, it asserted that if the federal government seeks to assert
a power that goes beyond what had already been upheld, it must justify that
extension for an unprecedented assertion of power. Even under the New
Federalism, the Court does not adjudge the constitutionality of the new law
purely based on originalism, but instead based on what Chief Justice
Rehnquist referred to as “first principles.”110 It is noteworthy that Justice
Thomas’s originalist opinion in Lopez was not joined by Justice Scalia
(same for Morrison).111 This tripartite taxonomy helps to explain why
originalism has, and has not been, used successfully in recent cases.
Perhaps the best examples in the first category are District of
Columbia v. Heller112 and McDonald v. Chicago.113 In these cases, the
See also STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 89 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing how case precedents exert a
degree of “gravitational force” of fairness that is considered when deciding later cases).
105 Josh Blackman, Recording: Video and Recap: Randy Barnett, Neil Katyal, & Paul Clement on
Federalist Society Panel on Obamacare #FedSoc2012, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 17, 2012),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/17/video-and-recap-randy-barnett-neil-katyal-paul-clement-onfederalist-society-panel-on-obamacare-fedsoc2012/; see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2364 (2011) (holding that “individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the rights
of the States”).
106 See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
107 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); W.
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
108 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
109
See John Valauri, Baffled by Inactivity: The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10
GEO. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2012) (describing the “thus far method and justification of constitutional
line drawing”).
110 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
111 Id. at 584.
112 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
113 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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Court was largely writing on a blank slate—precedential open fields, as
opposed to deep in the thicket.114 The Court was in no way bound by any
sort of New Deal compromise, as the precedential slate was clear. Thus, the
Court was free to receive, and did apply originalist arguments. In fact, both
the majority and dissent in Heller and McDonald advanced originalist
arguments.115
For decades, until Lopez and Morrison and other Rehnquist-era
precedents, the Supreme Court was steadfastly locked in the second zone of
the New Deal vision of Federalism. To paraphrase Larry Solum, that gestalt
had crystalized. However, originalism’s gravitational pull would crack that
chrysalis.
B.

Tugging Originalism, Wobbling Constitution
With my most sincere apologies to Judge Wilkinson, this cosmic
constitutional theory116 (quite literally) is instructive. In our solar system,
eight planets orbit around the Sun. The gravitational pull of our nearest star
keeps the planets in orbit. But (to grossly oversimplify), gravity pulls both
ways.117 Our planet exerts a pull, however small, on our star. To the extent
that the planet exerts a pull on the star, the star will wobble a bit towards
the planet.118 This principle of physics has enabled astronomers to locate
planets outside of our solar system (extrasolar planets).119 Astronomers are
only able to detect extrasolar planets—which are too small to be visible
even with advanced telescopes—by measuring shifts in the movement of
stars. If a star “wobbles,” that is a sign that a planet’s gravitational forces is
pulling on it.
In our jurisprudential solar system, think of our star as our
Constitution. Various planets that orbit the star represent different
constitutional theories. The strength of the theory can be viewed as a
114 See Josh Blackman, Originalism in Open Fields and In The Thickets, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/01/25/originalism-in-open-fields-and-in-thethickets/.
115 Josh Blackman, Alan Gura & Ilya Shapiro, The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities Clause,
2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163 (2010); Josh Blackman, Originalism for Dummies 2–17 (Working
Paper),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1318387.
116 J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING
THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012). My review of Judge Wilkinson’s book,
titled A Brief History of Judging: From the Big Bang to Cosmic Constitutional Theory, is available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179073
and
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/
01/book-review-a-brief-history-of-judging-from-the-big-bang-to-cosmic-constitutional-theory.html.
117 Newton
and Planetary Motion, UNIV. OF LA.-LINCOLN, http://astro.unl.edu/
naap/pos/pos_background2.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
118 Phil Plait, A tiny wobble reveals a massive planet, DISCOVER (May 29, 2009, 7:00 AM),
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/badastronomy/2009/05/29/a-tiny-wobble-reveals-a-massive-planet/.
119 NASA’s Hubble Reveals a New Class of Extrasolar Planet, HUBBLESITE (Feb. 21, 2012, 9:00
AM), http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/releases/2012/13/full/; CAL. INST. OF TECHNOLOGY,
PlanetQuest: The Search for Another Earth, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
http://planetquest.jpl.nasa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
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function of the gravitational pull the planet places on the star. If a theory
has some pull on the star, even if the theory is not that close to the star
itself, it still has some influence.
The tug of originalism, ever so slight, has been the force that has
helped to break federalism free from its New Deal-imposed chrysalis.
Originalist scholarship began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s that
showed that the Court had departed from the original understanding of the
Constitution in the New Deal cases, particularly with respect to federalism
and structural protections of individual liberty. This scholarship exerted a
pull on the Court’s jurisprudence, ever so subtle at first, but soon enough
the law, like a star being attracted to a planet, began to wobble.
Progressives observed this wobble, worried, and hoped that the
Constitution would remain in the sole-orbit of the New Deal. Cases like
New York v. United States,120 United States v. Lopez,121 Printz v. United
States,122 United States v. Morrison,123 Seminole Tribe v. Florida124 and
others collectively dubbed part of the “New Federalism,” have proven
otherwise.
Importantly, none of these cases were argued in terms of restoring the
original meaning of the Constitution. The advocates did not need to. It was
sufficient for the Justices to know that errors were made, those errors
would not be fixed—in Justice Scalia’s words, they were “water over the
dam.”125 However, with this understanding, the Court should go no further
from the Constitution’s original meaning without a sufficient justification
from the government. In each case, the government failed to meet that
burden, and the Court would go this far, but no further.
Consider Gonzales v. Raich,126 where Randy Barnett—one of the most
prominent originalists—did not advance an originalist argument. He did
not ask the Court to overturn Wickard (other than in a perfunctory sentence
in the brief).127 Barnett’s arguments accepted the legitimacy of Wickard,
but asked the Court to go no further. But Barnett did not need to advance
an originalist argument in Raich. I think it was not satisfactory to simply
say that advancing an originalist argument would be a losing argument.
The constitutional force of originalist scholarship documenting how the

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW.
U.L. REV. 169, 191 (2012).
126 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
127 Josh Blackman, Randy Barnett’s Changed Tune on Precedents and Unprecedentedness?, JOSH
BLACKMAN’S
BLOG
(MAY
29,
2012),
http://joshblackman.com/
blog/2012/05/29/randy-barnetts-changed-tune-on-precedents-and-unprecedentedness/.
120
121
122
123
124
125
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New Deal Court got the Commerce Clause wrong exerted the necessary
pull on the Court.
Raich, ultimately, did not turn out in Barnett’s favor as the Justices
saw that it did not go further than Wickard, so no further justification was
necessary.128 In other words, while Lopez and Morrison went too far, Raich
was still in the New Deal settlement’s inner-orbit. Perhaps one of the most
misunderstood lessons after Raich was whether this case presented a
repudiation of the New Federalism.129 Viewed in terms of the “this far, but
no farther” lens, the answer is no. The “New Federalism” did not go up in
smoke with Raich.130
C.

“New Federalism” and NFIB
NFIB v. Sebelius continues the movement of the “New Federalism.”
Though the law ultimately survived, I would caution you not to get too
hung up on counting the votes (the challengers got fourteen out of the
necessary fifteen votes in the words of Paul Clement131), which very well
may have changed. Rather than considering how it was ultimately decided,
instead we should look at how the case was litigated over the course of two
years from the district court all the way to the Supreme Court. Was this a
case where the government was able to easily argue that the ACA was
covered by the New Deal precedents like Wickard? Well they tried, but
failed, as most judges, even those that ruled in favor of the government,
acknowledged that this case was different, in at least one or more
respects.132 Academics who stated that this was an open-and-shut case soon
had to change their tune and refine their arguments when its failings were
highlighted.
Instead, the government tried to justify why this law was
constitutional, beyond simply citing Wickard and Raich. They did this by
focusing on the importance of regulating the costs of the health care
market, and stressing how Congress had the power to address this national
problem.133 In other words, the government’s behavior acknowledged that
this law was going beyond what Congress had done before, and the United
States was attempting to justify this departure.

Id.
Indeed, there was a “generational” divide within the Solicitor General’s office as to how to
treat Raich, and whether it represented a repudiation of Lopez and Morrison. This divide is evident in
the brief Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal submitted to the 4th, 6th, and 11th Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and the briefs Solicitor Donald Verrilli submitted to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court. The former position stressed that Lopez and Morrison were the outer
bounds of the government’s power, while the latter eschewed those limiting principles. For further
discussions of the government’s evolving view of the scope of the “New Federalism,” see BLACKMAN,
supra note 1.
130 See CHEECH AND CHONG’S UP IN SMOKE (Paramount Pictures 1978).
131 Blackman, supra note 105.
132 See generally Nat. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
133 See id. at 2584–85.
128
129
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This is the modus operandi for governmental litigation under the New
Federalism: this far, but no farther, without a sufficient justification. As
much as the government would hate to admit it, this case was not an openand-shut case of simply applying existing precedents. The United States’
unwillingness to identify a limiting principle in terms of Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich is evidence of that fact. The government’s decision not to rely on
existing precedents was due to a fear that Lopez and Morrison proved “too
capacious,” and “wouldn’t seem robust enough of a limiting principle
under these circumstances.” In other words, the Court’s precedents did not
resolve this matter, and the government assumed the burden of going
further.134 NFIB fits squarely (roundly?) within the third ring of federalism.
D.

Originalism’s Righting of Our Constitutional Lodestar
Because we are dealing with the “New Federalism,” where unlike
Heller or McDonald, it is infeasible to advance originalist arguments in the
absence of countervailing precedents, in NFIB, originalism was only
needed to have an indirect effect. It was clear that the ACA was not
supported under the original understanding of the Commerce Clause.
Barnett and others conceded this at the outset, but argued not in terms of
originalism. Rather they argued why this case went further than the New
Deal precedents (this is really what “unprecedented” means), and how the
government failed to meet its burden of justification. But, the years of
originalist scholarship demonstrating how the Commerce Clause was
originally understood imposed the burden on the government to
demonstrate this further departure from 1787.
In other words, the originalist scholarship placed a mild pull on the
star, and created the sense that perhaps it should not be pulled in the other
direction. The Chief Justice’s vote was not the only thing wobbling in
NFIB.
The potency of originalism cannot be measured simply by assessing
whether originalist arguments are advanced, and ultimately accepted in any
given case. Originalism’s strength can be seen as a factor of what view of
federalism and liberty the Court is laboring under. Originalism lays the
intellectual groundwork for understanding how a particular law deviates
from what has come before. Sensing how that theory pulls and tugs on our
constitutional lodestar provides enough of an indication that an act of
Congress has gone too far, and there needs to be an adequate justification.
So, in this sense, with the “New Federalism,” originalism’s
gravitational pull tugs the Constitution towards original meaning, even if
originalism is not directly advanced in a case. Originalism is the hidden
force that causes other things to shift, even if we do not directly see why.

134

BLACKMAN, supra note 1.
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This is why “this far and no further” works, even when originalist
arguments need not be made.
IV. POPULAR ORIGINALISM?
The unsettling of our constitutional gestalt between 2009 and 2012
may be attributed to two important, and interrelated factors inherent in the
challenge to the Affordable Care Act: legal theories and the social
movements supporting them. I do not assert that the popular support for the
challenge solely determined the constitutionality of the mandate. Nor do I
claim that the theories of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses
were adequate to render the mandate unconstitutional.
Neither approach was by itself enough. Here, the whole was greater
than the sum of its parts. The popular constitutionalist movement, along
with the theoretical arguments were both necessary, but not sufficient
conditions to advance the challenge. However both fronts, when engaged in
tandem proved quite potent—particularly because the original
understanding of the Constitution animated both avenues.
Originalism’s tug was felt in both aspects of this challenge. The legal
arguments, though grounded in terms of the Court’s modern
jurisprudence—acquiescing to many nonoriginalist precedents—gravitated
towards an originalist understanding of enumerated powers, federalism,
and individual liberty. Likewise, the social movement opposed to the law,
embodied most prominently in the Tea Party, was organized loosely around
an originalist vision of the Constitution and founding of the United
States.135 In this sense, the two-pronged approach of popular
constitutionalism and legalism were in the orbit of originalism, even if
originalism was not at the fore of the challenge. This approach is similar to
what Rebecca Zietlow has referred to as popular originalism.136
Indeed, some of the most successful constitutional movements in our
nation harkened back to our foundational charter. The Abolitionist
Movement, led prominently by Lysander Spooner, cited the Declaration of
135 See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 288, 298 (2011) (“The Tea Party movement is a surprising hybrid of these
two positions, a sort of popular originalism, a popular movement that purports to advance originalist
interpretations.”).
136 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 487 (2012) (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly, originalism and
popular constitutionalism can lead in very different directions when determining the relationship
between democratic participation and constitutional development. The popular originalism of the Tea
Party raises the issue of whether it is possible to be faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution
while engaging in democratic politics. If not, popular originalism could paradoxically lead to a
reduction of the role of democracy in constitutional interpretation.”); see also Lee Strang, Originalism
as Popular Constitutionalism?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 254 (“[T]here is no necessary analytical
connection or disjunction between” originalism and popular constitutionalism); Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 672 (2009); see generally Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement
and the Perils of Popular Originalism: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 827 (2011).
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Independence’s promise of equality, and the Constitution’s omission of any
reference to slavery to support the legal argument that slavery was
unconstitutional.137 Susan B. Anthony, leader of the Suffrage Movement,
broadly read the 14th Amendment to guarantee equality to “all persons.”138
In many respects, District of Columbia v. Heller could be understood
as a product of popular originalism.139 The legal theories that supported the
individual right to keep and bear arms were supported by originalism.
Likewise, the social movement buttressing firearm ownership—led most
prominently by the National Rifle Association (NRA)—waxed nostalgic
for the liberties of the revolutionary-era minutemen (though the NRA tried
repeatedly to sabotage the case).140
What made the evolution of NFIB v. Sebelius so unprecedented, at
least as far as constitutional litigation goes, is the seamless union of the
theories and the movement at all levels of government and the populace.
The political and social climate in which this challenge came of age created
a veritable perfect storm for this popular originalist case. Learning how to
replicate this dual-focused phenomenon may be the most enduring lesson
for future constitutional challenges.

137 Helen J. Knowles, Seeing the Light: Lysander Spooner’s Increasingly Popular
Constitutionalism,
available
at
http://hknowles.typepad.com/files/knowles---ls-and-popularconstitutionalism---law-and-history-review-final-draft-1.pdf.
138 Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New
World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 34, 36 n.159 (2008).
139 For a related, but different take on Heller’s popular constitutionalism, see Reva B. Siegel,
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93
(2008) (“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in
the late twentieth century through popular constitutionalism. It situates originalism’s claim to ground
judicial decision making outside of politics in the constitutional politics of the late twentieth century,
and demonstrates how Heller respects claims and compromises forged in social movement conflict over
the right to bear arms in the decades after Brown v. Board of Education.”).
140 See generally ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA (2011); Josh Blackman, Book Reviews: The Supreme Court’s New Battlefield, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1207 (2012) (reviewing Winkler’s work).

